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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines Vietnam’s efforts during the past two and a 
half decades to build up its legal infrastructure during its transition from a 
centrally planned to a market economy. In particular, this Article will 
focus on the development of legal and regulatory infrastructure to support 
the development of the corporate sector and fiduciary culture in Vietnam. 
In thinking about corporate law, I do not intend to single out this particular 
area of law as somehow special in the context of transition. In fact, its 
commonness and generality are what makes the experience of the 
development of corporate law and corporate culture so useful in thinking 
about the rule of law, law and development, and the role of culture in the 
development of legal systems. This Article is written with some degree of 
humility; the source of this humility is a recognition that the legal and 
regulatory infrastructure at the center of the new rule of law movement is 
not an unbending prerequisite for successful development of the corporate 
sector, and that development of fiduciary culture requires more than law 
in books. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and Soviet-styled central 
planning beginning in the late 1980s, transition countries like Vietnam 
faced immediate and critical challenges to transition to new market-
oriented models of organization.1 Currently, this transition from central 
planning to markets is a decades-long project that remains incomplete. 
Central to all these transition efforts has been a near-wholesale reworking 
of the legal structures undergirding economic and social relationships. 
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There is little doubt that the adoption of new legal rules governing 
business entities was an essential component in spurring the growth of the 
private sector in Vietnam. However, the shift from a restrictive regulatory 
environment to a more open, enabling one was, in part, hoped to create a 
fiduciary culture amongst managers and shareholders. A fiduciary culture 
is one in which typical fiduciary norms of care and loyalty are respected 
and enforced by shareholders. However, now almost two decades later, 
transition of the corporate sector to a fiduciary culture remains a work in 
progress. Although formal legal structures to support the creation of a 
market-oriented private sector are now in place, such structures remain 
insufficient for norm creation, and the development of a robust fiduciary 
culture remains far afield. 
A principal source of deficiencies in corporate governance in 
Vietnam lies with still nascent acceptance of fiduciary norms as a vital 
component of the corporate law. Rather than rely on a bottom-up 
development of fiduciary norms by way of shareholder enforcement, there 
is evidence that regulators remain committed to a public enforcement 
approach to corporate governance.2 Old habits die hard, as they say. 
Whether a top-down public enforcement approach to norm creation will 
be more efficacious than developing a shareholder-centric fiduciary 
culture remains an open question. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
other informal transmission vectors present in Vietnam, beyond the courts 
and formal legal structures, which make the development of a 
self-enforcing fiduciary culture possible, though not guaranteed. 
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I of this Article 
places the development of Vietnam’s new corporate governance structures 
in the context of the larger law and development movements since the late 
1960s. Part II of this Article describes the new rule of law movement and 
the role of corporate law in that project. In Part III, this Article describes 
formal governance structures adopted as part of corporate law reform and 
identifies weaknesses in the development of fiduciary norms as a 
continuing weakness of Vietnam’s corporate governance structures. Part 
IV evaluates informal transmission vectors, like trade agreements and 
foreign investment, that might support the development of fiduciary 
culture. 
I. THE LAW AND DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENTS 
During the 1960s, many international aid agencies undertook efforts 
to engage in the development of legal systems to accompany their 
economic development activities. These law-oriented projects were 
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undergirded by concepts of “legal liberalism.”3 In its broadest sense, legal 
liberalism has a number of components. First, the state is the central 
organizing authority for societies. Second, the state acts through law. 
Third, laws are designed to achieve some socially valuable purpose 
through some sort of representative process. Fourth, these laws are applied 
equally for the purposes they were designed for. Fifth, courts are the 
central institution for the implementation of legal order; and finally, that 
society tends to conform to rules.4 
Key to understanding the focus of attention of the law and 
development movement on formal legal institutions is the concept of legal 
liberalism and the power and centrality of the state, a centrality that was 
often as much assumed as it was reflective of reality. This view of law in 
the 1960s saw law and legal institutions as tools to be deployed to facilitate 
economic development and the development of civil society.5 Ultimately, 
these highly formalistic, U.S.-centric approaches were met with a high 
degree of skepticism.6 Few, if any, of the assumptions of legal liberalism 
survived arrival in the post-colonial, developing world. The developing 
world had little appetite to import U.S. legal institutions.7 
Since the collapse of the law and development movements in the 
1960s, two major milestones fueled a resurgence of interest in the question 
of law and its relationship to economic development. The first of these was 
the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc and economic reform in Asian 
Socialist economies starting in the late 1980s. The second motivation was 
the development of a global trading regime under the rubric of the World 
Trade Organization during the 1990s.8 
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A new law and development movement arose in the wake of the 
beginning of the transition experience across Eastern Europe and Asia, 
notwithstanding resistance to its American-centric predecessor under the 
rubric of the “rule of law.”9 The transition from central planning to market-
oriented economies highlighted the importance of legal systems. 
Functioning markets require rules. Sometimes market rules are 
spontaneously developed, but mostly they are not.10 Because the 
regulatory structures of Soviet-styled systems were wholly inappropriate 
for the market, a legal and regulatory vacuum accompanied every 
transition from planning to market. The regulatory and legal structures of 
the ancien regime were either going to be ignored or were going to be 
revamped to become more supportive of market activity.11 
Soviet-styled legal regimes focused heavily on questions of criminal 
and family law to the exclusion of civil law.12 This is, of course, is entirely 
understandable. In a Soviet-styled central plan, there were no civil, 
commercial relationships; rather, the central plan dictated all economic 
production.13 To the extent there were disputes amongst economic units, 
with respect to production and fulfillment of the plan (e.g., how much of 
which type of product produced at what time), such disputes were resolved 
through bureaucratic processes and not the courts.14 
When central planning melted away, there was an obvious void. 
Courts and the legal system, more used to prosecuting the guilty with 
criminal sanctions, were out of their depth and without much by way of 
guidance for navigating the new world of civil, commercial disputes. They 
would need a wholly new regulatory structure to quickly fill the void left 
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by the collapse of economic planning institutions. Carothers calls this 
focus on the laws “type 1 reforms” and the focus on strengthening legal 
institutions, like courts, “type 2 reforms.”15 Of course, the new rule of law 
movement expanded well beyond the primary focus of rebuilding the 
regulatory infrastructure to support the development of markets (type 1 
and type 2 reforms) as the countries of the former-Soviet Republics and 
Eastern Europe moved to develop new political systems. The new rule of 
law movement reached back to many of the same themes of democracy 
promotion hailed by the original law and development movement.16 
Nevertheless, in Asian transition economies like Vietnam, where 
reform efforts were more gradual, the focus of rule of law efforts remained 
on dismantling and then rebuilding the outdated regulatory structure to 
support markets. Left largely untouched in Vietnam are what Carothers 
calls “type 3” reforms.17 Type 3 reforms have deeper goals, including the 
development of a culture of compliance with the law by citizens as well as 
the government itself.18 Included under the larger umbrella of type 3 
reforms is the development of fiduciary culture in the corporate sector. 
The new rule of law movement started, in part, from the assumption 
that strong legal rights are fundamental to a functioning market 
economy.19 The theoretical basis for the movement is attractive. Where 
legal rights are strong (e.g., property and contract rights are protected), 
parties can engage in anonymous market transactions safe in the 
knowledge that private contractual promises are backed by a reasonably 
efficient public enforcement regime. Strong public enforcement 
institutions can provide a backdrop against which parties feel confident in 
engaging in transactions with strangers, often with many terms still left 
undefined.20 Consequently, a system of strong legal rights working in the 
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background can generate high levels of “generalized trusts,” even among 
strangers, and translates into a greater willingness of economic actors to 
make long-term investments and engage in complex transactions, thus 
facilitating economic development.21 
In the context of post-Soviet transition economies, the new rule of 
law movement found a home, beginning in the 1990s.22 Formal legal 
structures designed to support central planning systems found themselves 
hopelessly antiquated following the shift to markets. Formal structures and 
institutions were simply unable to manage, and generalized trust suffered. 
Consequently, economic transition provided an urgent impetus to rule of 
law activities that were missing during the height of the law and 
development movement. Such activities included a host of top-down 
efforts to rewrite legislation as well as efforts to reorient and train the 
judiciary, not unlike many of the efforts of the law and development 
movement of the past.23 The challenge, especially in Vietnam, remains 
moving from type 1 and type 2 reforms to type 3 reforms (i.e., developing 
fiduciary culture). Developing things like fiduciary culture takes much 
more time, and thus, remains a work in progress. 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW PROJECT 
One of the first issues on the transition agenda was the reformation 
of economic relations and recognition of a role for the private sector; 
specifically, for the private corporate sector.24 Certainly, there are many 
issues on the transition agenda, but for the former Soviet satellites in crisis 
and Asian socialist countries embarking on a reform agenda, the company 
law—for a time—took its place at the very front of the line. The 1990s 
were heady days for U.S. corporate governance.25 Having shown its 
predominance over the less than optimal socialist model for economic 
organization, it was no surprise that legal and development specialists 
sought to export this model to economies desperate to restructure. 
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Although the early 1990s appeared to be the end of history for 
corporate law, it was more of a modest pause in its development. The 
corporate law, like all law, is not static, but it is constantly evolving in 
response to changing environments. The framework motivating our 
understanding of corporate governance can be traced to the important 
work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. The impetus for Professors 
Berle and Means when they wrote The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property in 1932 was that the United States was itself in the midst of 
transition in terms of the structure of corporate ownership.26 During the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the “era of finance capital,” most 
publicly-traded U.S. businesses were controlled entities, with financiers, 
entrepreneurs, and families controlling most of the country’s corporate 
assets.27 Professors Berle and Means observed that by 1932, the corporate 
ownership structure of most publicly-traded corporations was made up of 
many shareholders with atomized holdings, the effect of which was that 
no individual or group of shareholders could control the corporation. 
Rather, their managers controlled the corporations. The structure of 
ownership uncovered by Professors Berle and Means led them to conclude 
that the central problem of the corporate law is understanding and then 
mitigating the power attributable to managers that results from the 
separation of ownership and control.28 
However, at the time, there was a debate between the view offered 
by Professors Berle and Means and others, principally Professor E. 
Merrick Dodd, who espoused a more managerial view of the corporate 
law.29 Professor Dodd argued that managers of the corporation held their 
position in a kind of trust.30 As a result, their obligations were broad and 
included all sorts of constituencies like workers and the community, in 
addition to their stockholders.31 Ultimately, Dodd’s view held sway for 
quite some time. It was not until the 1970s when Milton Friedman 
published his article, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
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Profits, that the idea of shareholder primacy began to take hold.32 During 
the 1980s and 1990s, legal scholars seconded this view and developed the 
vocabulary of agency costs that dealt with the problem of the separation 
of ownership and control observed by Professors Berle and Means.33 By 
the time the transition took hold in formerly centrally planned systems, 
corporate law had reached its end: minimization of agency costs in firms 
with the atomized shareholding structures identified by Professors Berle 
and Means. 
However, over the course of the twentieth and early into the twenty-
first century, the structure of corporate ownership did not remain the same. 
Publicly traded corporations are no longer owned by stockholders with 
atomized holdings.34 Rather, we have entered a new age of financial 
capitalism. With the rise of institutional investors over the past two 
decades, Berle and Mean’s separation of ownership and control is no 
longer the default regime. Institutional holders with larger blocks are in a 
better position to advocate for themselves vis-a-vis managers, and agency 
problems are, if not mitigated, at least not of the same type identified by 
Berle and Means and academic economists of the 1980s. Institutional 
holders, due to the size of their holdings, have economic incentives to 
police managers. It is no surprise that by any objective measure we are 
now in a period where shareholders are able to assert their power over 
managers in ways that a century ago might not have been conceivable.35 
As it turns out, the corporate ownership structure identified by Berle 
and Means may have been an outlier, rather than the rule.36 Even before 
our current swing back toward controlling shareholders and institutional 
blockholding, controllers and blockholding were, and continue to be, the 
                                                     
 32. See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. This issue and the current debate on shareholder 
primacy is well described by Professor Lynn Stout. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
(2012). 
 33. Among others, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 34. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 
(Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 19-07, 2019).  
 35. See Leo E. Strine, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors: A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 454–55 (2014). 
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norm around the world.37 The ubiquity of blockholding rather than 
atomized stockholding structures raises a question about the ultimate 
efficacy of the advice given by corporate governance experts to transition 
economies in the 1990s to adopt governance regimes modeled on the 
Berle–Means conception of separation of ownership and management. 
Rule of law proponents may have been assuming the efficiency and 
sustainability of U.S. corporate ownership structures while attempting to 
replicate what is actually an outlier corporate governance structure. The 
subsequent rise of controller dominated ownership structures in transition 
economies suggests the real limits of the path selected by adherents to the 
new rule of law project of the 1990s.38 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
IN VIETNAM 
Vietnam began its economic transition (Đổi Mới) from central 
planning to market in earnest during the early 1990s. Early on in its reform 
process, Vietnam embarked on an ambitious effort to remake its formal 
legal structures from the top-down to support the development of the new 
market economy. While this effort has been aggressive in many respects, 
it has fallen short of a complete remake of Vietnam’s legal system and 
institutions. One area where Vietnam has given a high degree of focus is 
in the sphere of economic management. Early on, Vietnam’s technocratic 
elite realized that a wholesale reworking of the regulatory structure 
supporting enterprises was going to be critical to the long-term success or 
failure of the reform effort. 
The legislative framework for the corporate sector in Vietnam has 
undergone revision multiple times since the early 1990s.39 While later 
changes focused on increasing the variety and complexity of business 
forms available, the earliest revisions during the beginning of the reform 
process were perhaps most significant and more lasting. The most 
fundamental change to the corporate law occurred with the design of the 
initial revision. In the Enterprise Law of 1999, Vietnam shifted from a 
                                                     
 37. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership 
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“prohibitive” to an “enabling” paradigm with attributes of self-
enforcement by shareholders.40 
A. Enabling Legislation 
Early efforts at reform included the 1987 Foreign Investment Law, 
recognizing a role for private foreign investment.41 In 1990, the 
government promulgated the Private Enterprise and Companies Laws, 
which recognized the private sector and permitted the creation of a private 
corporate sector for the first time.42 During this period, government 
authorities attempted to maintain strict control over the operation of 
businesses by leaning heavily on the familiar, but outdated, doctrine of 
ultra vires.43 During this period, government authorities took aggressive 
positions to attempt to control investment and business activities by both 
the foreign and domestic private sector. Often, this application of power 
was little more than arbitrary.44 
The Enterprise Law of 1999 shifted the locus of decision-making and 
power in the establishment of new companies from the government to 
entrepreneurs. Under the previous petition system (xin-cho), the granting 
of a corporate charter or authorization was discretionary with local 
government authorities in a position to hold up applications for company 
charters.45 There are at least two implications of the petition system. First, 
to the extent formal or informal government policy opposed the 
development of private enterprise generally or in specific sectors, the 
withholding or the granting of required authorizations to do business was 
a powerful level to direct or inhibit growth of commercial activity. Second, 
the petition system also had a pernicious effect. By consolidating 
discretionary power with a small number of authorities, the petition system 
                                                     
 40. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. 
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Hakkala & Ari Kokko, The State and Private Sector in Vietnam 3 (Eur. Inst. of Japanese Stud., 
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 44. See PHAM DUY NGHIA, VIETNAM BUSINESS LAW IN TRANSITION 56 (2002). 
 45. The observer will note the parallels between such a system and that which prevailed in the 
U.S. during the nineteenth century. It was only after the turn of the twentieth century that U.S. states 
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1875–1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 681 (1989) (documenting New Jersey’s path from a system of 
special incorporation charters to general enabling statutes). 
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gave rise to opportunities and incentives for corruption.46 Not surprisingly, 
although the private sector was formally recognized, the top-down 
approach to managing development of the private sector inhibited its 
growth. 
The single most important change in the 1999 Enterprise Law was 
the turning of the incorporation process on its head.47 By moving from a 
petition system to one where incorporation becomes a statutory right, the 
law, as written, had two immediate effects. First, it reduced the 
discretionary authority of local officials to deny corporate registrations; 
and thus, reduced opportunities and incentives for corruption.48 Second, 
by removing obstacles to registration and incorporation and thus enabling 
the private sector, the law unleashed commercial activity in the private 
sector.49 
The 1999 Enterprise Law marks another important step: the shifting 
of regulation of corporate organization from public law to private law, at 
least on paper. This was a significant shift because rather than relying on 
government enforcement to regulate the internal organization of business 
organizations, the 1999 Enterprise Law moves that burden to private 
parties who have a greater incentive to order their own affairs as well as 
to monitor the actions of managers. This shift also reflects a more 
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Corruption]; John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and 
Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 211, 215 (2005); see also Camden Hutchison, 
Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement, 
3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1017, 1086–87 (2017) (noting that the federal incorporation movement would 
reduce incentives for state legislators to engage in corrupt behavior). 
 47. See LUẬT DOANH NGHIỆP [LAW ON ENTERPRISES] [No. 13/1999/QH10] art. 9 (1999) (Viet.). 
 48. Prior to the adoption enabling statutes in the United States, each corporate charter offered 
opportunities for corruption. During the “charter mongering” period, states, principally New Jersey, 
liberalized their state corporate laws and routinized the process of incorporation, in part to reduce 
incentives for corruption. Grandy, supra note 45, at 681. In that sense, the enabling structure was a 
gift of the Progressive Movement and not explicitly intended to reduce the costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and control. See Wallis, The Concept of Systemic Corruption, supra note 46, 
at 49–51 (explaining that states solved the paradox of corruption and the promotion of economic 
development by granting a corporate charter to anyone who wanted one, thereby reducing the incentive 
for legislative corruption). 
 49. See DWIGHT H. PERKINS & VU THANH TU ANH, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH.: ASH INST. FOR 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION, VIETNAM’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY: DESIGNING 
POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 25 (2008), https://ash.harvard.edu/files/vietnams 
_industrial_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QPQ-6RMW]. 
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fundamental policy view that the internal organization of business affairs 
is best accomplished through private ordering. The effect of this 
restructuring is stark. During the first five years following the adoption of 
the 1999 Enterprise Law, more than 136,400 formal private companies 
were registered in Vietnam, and importantly, the pace of new formations 
increased dramatically following the adoption of the 1999 Enterprise 
Law.50 The pace of business formation has increased substantially since 
the implementation of the Enterprise Law. In just the first months of 2019, 
Vietnam’s General Statistics Office reported 70,000 (net of 
closures/dissolutions) new enterprises registered nationwide.51 By any 
measure, the transformation of the business incorporation process from a 
petition to a registration system can only be seen as a success made 
possible by the Enterprise Law. 
Figure 1: Domestic Private Business Registration in Vietnam  
(1991–2006)52 
 
                                                     
 50. EDMUND J. MALESKY, VIETNAM PROVINCIAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX 1 (2005) (on file 
with Seattle University Law Review). 
 51. See Social and Economic Situation in Eight Months of 2019, VIET. GEN. STAT. OFF. (Aug. 
15, 2019), https://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=622&ItemID=19340 (last visited Jan. 22, 
2020). 
 52. PERKINS & ANH, supra note 49, at 26. New business formations in the last few years have 
been as follows: 
2015    94,800 
2016  110,100 
2017  126,859 
2018  131,300 
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Later revisions to Vietnam’s legal infrastructure have deepened and 
filled out many (though not all) of the gaps in the laws governing business 
organizations and corporate governance. By now, the legal infrastructure 
surrounding business organizations include a variety of structures for 
small as well as large corporate forms.53 Vietnam has also opened two 
relatively large public stock exchanges (Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi) to 
attract local as well as foreign capital.54 Additionally, Vietnam has 
developed formal legal structures governing the regulation of foreign 
investment through laws, trade, and investment agreements. 
Vietnam now has had more than two decades of experience with 
various corporate forms.55 The prevailing corporate form for larger or 
publicly traded firms is the Joint Stock Company (JSC).56 In most 
governance-related respects, the JSC—at least formally—looks like its 
U.S. publicly-traded counterparts. In fact, they share many of the same 
general governance mechanisms. One might conclude that since formal 
Vietnamese corporate governance structures closely resemble those of 
U.S. corporations, Vietnamese firms will have, over the past two decades, 
also adopted fiduciary cultures similar to those of U.S. firms; however, 
this has not been the case. The development of a fiduciary culture has not 
necessarily followed the adoption of formal governance structures. 
B. Fiduciary Culture and Corporate Governance 
While the enabling nature of the 1999 Enterprise Law has had an 
almost immediate impact on the atmosphere surrounding business 
incorporation, it did little to encourage the development of internal 
corporate governance or a fiduciary culture amongst managers and 
shareholders.57 Broadly defined, a fiduciary culture is one in which typical 
                                                     
Released Publications, VIET. GEN. STAT. OFF., https://www.gso.gov.vn/Default_en.aspx?tabid=515 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
 53. See generally LUẬT DOANH NGHIỆP [LAW ON ENTERPRISES] [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 1 
(Viet.) (covering limited liability companies, joint-stock companies, partnerships, private companies, 
and enterprise groups). 
 54. Recent research by Cuong et al., confirms what appears obvious to the casual observer of 
Vietnam’s stock market. Cuong et al. find that Vietnam’s stock markets are subject to “noise trader 
risk,” the effect of uninformed traders to move stock prices. See Phan Khoa Cuong, Tran Thi Bich 
Ngoc, Bui Thanh Cong & Vo Thi Quynh Chau, Noise Trader Risk: Evidence from Vietnam’s Stock 
Markets, 128 HUE U. J. SCI. 5 (2019). Similarly, Vo and Phan find evidence of uninformed herd trading 
behavior in Vietnamese stock markets. See Xuan Vinh Vo & Dang Bao Anh Phan, Further Evidence 
on the Herd Behavior in Vietnam Stock Market, 13 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL FIN. 33 (2017). 
 55. These various forms include multiple member LLC, single-member LLC, partnership, 
business cooperation contract, public–private partnership, and the joint stock company, among others. 
 56. See generally BAKER & MCKENZIE, LLP, FORMS OF DOING BUSINESS IN VIETNAM (2016), 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/forms-of-doing-business-
in-vietnam-2017.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/D2D4-GPNS]. 
 57. See infra pp. 595–96. 
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fiduciary norms of care and loyalty are respected and enforced by 
shareholders. The development of fiduciary culture in Vietnam has been 
long in the making. 
The 2014 Enterprise Law addressed some of these issues for the first 
time.58 Under Article 160 of the 2014 Enterprise Law, managers have 
statutory obligations of both care and loyalty with regards to their 
management of the company: 
Art. 160. Responsibilities of managers of [the] company 
1. Each member of the Board of Management, the director or general 
director and other manager [of a company] has the following 
responsibilities:  
 (a) To exercise his or her delegated powers and perform his or 
her delegated obligations strictly in accordance with this Law, in 
relevant laws, the charter of the company, and the resolutions of the 
General Meeting of Shareholders; 
  (b) To exercise his or her delegated powers and perform his or 
her delegated obligations honestly and prudently to their best ability 
in order to assure the maximum legitimate interests of the company;  
 (c) To be loyal to the interests of the company and shareholders; 
not to use information, know- how, business opportunities of the 
company, [not to abuse] his or her position and powers and not to use 
assets of the company for his or her own personal benefit or for the 
benefit of other organizations or individuals . . . .59 
To the extent corporate law seeks to mitigate agency problems and 
foster the development of fiduciary culture, obligations of both care and 
loyalty by managers are a cornerstone.60 However, the mere incantation of 
obligations without a mechanism for self-enforcement of these obligations 
does not accomplish a great deal. 
The formal self-enforcing governance structures available in the 
2014 Enterprise Law go well beyond even governance standards set by the 
                                                     
 58. The more common approach to fiduciary duties is through application of the criminal laws. 
For example, a manager of a state-owned enterprise can be charged with the crime of “waste” of 
corporate assets in the event the enterprise suffers losses under his or her management. See, e.g., 
Former AVG Chairman Detained in Bribery Probe, VIỆT NAM NEWS (Apr. 13, 2019), https://vietnam 
news.vn/politics-laws/518716/former-avg-chairman-detained-in-bribery-probe.html#uW1OjYWtM1 
g7ydVo.97 [https://perma.cc/F39V-ZC6K] (alleging “violations in the management and use of public 
investment capital causing serious consequences at MobiFone Telecommunications Corporation and 
relevant agencies”). 
 59. LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 160 (Viet.). 
 60. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1996). 
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Delaware corporate code.61 Vietnam’s 2014 Enterprise law builds on 
earlier iterations of Vietnam’s enterprise law in that it is enabling and not 
prohibitive in nature.62 The law also creates a framework for shareholders 
to engage in the private ordering of affairs of the corporation, to monitor 
the behavior of managers, and to intercede when they believe managers 
may have exceeded their authority or otherwise harmed the corporation.63 
To the extent the current enterprise law gives tools to shareholders to 
permit them to engage in self-help, one could also characterize Vietnam’s 
current enterprise law as self-enforcing in nature. Among other things, it 
delegates power to the shareholders to do the following: 
 Elect and remove directors; 
 Adopt a corporate strategy; 
 Approve related party transactions (similar to Delaware’s § 144); 
 Approve financial statements; 
 Decide on redemption of 10% or more of company’s stock; and 
 Consider and decide breaches by the board.64 
To facilitate private enforcement of the director’s obligations, the 
2014 Enterprise Law delegates the authority to shareholders to bring 
derivative actions against managers of the company who may have fallen 
short.65 Shareholders have the right to seek books and records of the 
company for the purpose of evaluating managers’ performance.66 
Shareholders also have the power to replace underperforming directors at 
the annual shareholder meeting.67 These governance mechanisms are self-
help tools typically relied on by shareholders to develop a fiduciary culture 
where shareholders, looking out for their own interests, can monitor 
managers. 
Just as the presence of enabling laws does not necessarily result in 
the development of a fiduciary culture, neither does the presence of 
statutory self-enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, there is a lack of evidence 
that the legal duties of care and loyalty spelled out in the Enterprise Law 
have translated into a corresponding fiduciary culture. 
Any self-enforcement regime requires disclosure in order to assure 
its efficacy. Notwithstanding requirements, corporate disclosure is in 
relatively short supply. The Securities Law as well as the Enterprise Law 
                                                     
 61. See LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] (Viet.). 
 62. See LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 13/1999/QH10] (1999) (Viet.). 
 63. See id. 
 64. LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 114, 135 (Viet.); Hikari Oguchi et al., 
Vietnam, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2013, at 286 (2013). 
 65. LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 161 (Viet.). 
 66. Id. at art. 162, 165. 
 67. Id. at art. 156. 
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require that listed companies disclose certain material information about 
the company, including information related to the company’s governing 
documents, financials, and material events that occur on a corporate 
website.68 Take, for example, Vinamilk, a listed Vietnamese joint stock 
company and one of Vietnam’s largest and best regarded corporations. 
Vinamilk discloses its governing documents, its current financial 
information, and its press releases related to material events affecting the 
company on its own website.69 The structure of disclosure requirements in 
the Securities Law is consistent with that which would be required to 
develop self-enforcing fiduciary norms. Compliance with the disclosure 
requirements under the Securities Law, however, is not uniform. Many 
listed firms do not post even the most basic corporate information required 
under the law to their public websites.70 To the extent the law’s 
requirement is intended to inform shareholders and facilitate self-
enforcement via a distributed publishing requirement in lieu of a central 
public filing system (e.g., SEC’s EDGAR), its distributed structure lacks 
efficacy.71 
Notwithstanding the self-enforcement mechanisms built into both 
cornerstone laws governing the corporate sector in Vietnam, there is 
minimal evidence that shareholders rely on them. Shareholders have the 
power to bring lawsuits to enforce their legal rights against managers. 
Though at times abused, this power is a vital tool in corporate governance 
in the U.S. In the context of Vietnamese companies, there is little evidence 
that shareholders bring suits to police against manager opportunism. 
Litigation to police manager agency costs is permitted under the Enterprise 
Law, but it is rarely taken up.72 A rare example of a shareholder bringing 
such a suit involved the divorce between Mr. Dang Le Nguyen Vu and his 
wife, Le Hoang Diep Thao. Mr. Vu is the founder of Trung Nguyen, a 
                                                     
 68. LUẬT CHỨNG KHOÁN [LAW OF STOCK] [No. 70/2006/QH11] art. 100–01 (Viet.). 
 69. See Welcome to Vinamilk’s Investor Relations Shareholders’ Meeting, VINAMILK (Sept. 4, 
2019), https://www.vinamilk.com.vn/en/shareholders-meeting [https://perma.cc/Y7K2-57U2]. 
 70. Compliance generally includes a corporate charter, resumes of directors, financial 
statements, and shareholder meeting information. See, e.g., VIETNAMOBILE, http://vietnamobile. 
com.vn/ [https://perma.cc/2VLN-SKJ8]; VNG GROUP, https://www.vng.com.vn [https://perma.cc/HT 
57-DVE3]; VIETNAM RAILWAYS, http://www.vr.com.vn/ [https://perma.cc/9VW4-D643]. 
 71. See generally VINH NGUYEN, ANH TRAN & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, INSIDER TRADING 
AND STOCK SPLITS (2012) (on file with Seattle University Law Review) (with respect to run of the 
mill corporate governance issues, the weakness of self-enforcement is not necessarily made up for by 
effective public enforcement of the enterprise law. From the opening of the stock exchange in Ho Chi 
Minh City until 2011, there was only one prosecution for violation of Vietnam’s insider trading 
regulations). 
 72. E-mail from Baker & McKenzie Partner to Author in Ho Chi Minh City (Oct. 5, 2018) 
(confirming that shareholders rarely bring litigation) (on file with author). 
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large, private coffee company.73 In addition to the joint assets owned with 
Mr. Vu, Ms. Thao was a ten-percent shareholder of Trung Nguyen.74 She 
filed a lawsuit against her husband’s decision to dismiss her from the 
company, claiming it prevented her from participating in running and 
managing the company as part of the divorce proceedings.75 Ultimately, 
the court ordered Ms. Thao’s shares appraised for fair value.76 
The fact that few Vietnamese shareholders access the courts is no 
real surprise. The domestic courts have a long-standing reputation for 
corruption and reports of payments to judges for favorable rulings are 
commonplace.77 In such a situation, it is not at all unusual that shareholders 
might view courts as anemic and unhelpful and thus not pursue a court 
remedy to assert fiduciary or other corporate governance claims. 
1. Corruption as a Fiduciary Claim 
In the absence of actual fiduciary duty litigation brought by 
shareholders, one can look for proxies for evidence of fiduciary culture. 
Professor Sung Hui Kim has argued that corporate corruption is essentially 
a subset of the fiduciary problem.78 In that sense, corporate corruption 
including bribes and secret commissions, corporate opportunities, 
renewals and reversions, misappropriation of confidential information, 
and other conflicts of interest are all examples of fiduciary violations.79 
                                                     
 73. See Ky Hoa, Vietnam’s Coffee Queen Checkmates King in One Court Case, VNEXPRESS 
(Sept. 21, 2018), https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/companies/vietnam-s-coffee-queen-check 
mates-king-in-one-court-case-3812946.html [https://perma.cc/85A4-ENVH]. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (it should be noted that appraisal is not statutorily available given the facts in this 
particular case. Nevertheless, the court decided to proceed with an appraisal rather than a judicial 
dissolution or other statutory remedy); see also Đặng Lê Nguyên Vũ và câu nói 'như xát muối' vào tim Lê 
Hoàng Diệp Thảo, TIN MOI (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.tinmoi.vn/dang-le-nguyen-vu-va-cau-noi-nhu-
xat-muoi-vao-tim-le-hoang-diep-thao-011517224.html [https://perma.cc/7JUJ-9NK4]. 
 77. See Conference Tackles Judicial Corruption, VIET. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://vietnam 
news.vn/society/266075/conference-tackles-judicial-corruption.html#7HKZPaHDOyP18hIU.97 
[https://perma.cc/QV8F-CNY4]. Nguyen Duc Chinh, Deputy Justice Minister, stated, “Corrupt 
officials make up a big proportion of the judicial office and it is hard for the public to trust the judicial 
system.” Id. Nguyen Van Hau, Deputy Chairman of the HCM City Lawyers Association, admitted 
that “a lot of lawyers pay bribes [to get a favorable verdict] because judicial officials demand them.” 
Id. See generally Transformation Index BTI Report: Vietnam Country Report, BERTELSMANN 
STIFTUNG (2016), https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/vnm/ity/2016/itr 
/aso/ [https://perma.cc/Y75L-P8AF] (discussing Vietnam’s corruption in the private sector).  
 78. See Sung Hui Kim, Fiduciary Law’s Anti-Corruption Norm, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
FIDUCIARY LAW 117 (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith eds., 2018). 
 79. Id. at 118. 
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It is no secret that corruption in Vietnamese companies is endemic.80 
For example, a 2018 study on corporate corruption sponsored by the 
Vietnamese Communist Party found more than fifty-four percent of 
11,000 firms that responded made informal payments.81 Seven percent of 
enterprises responding to the same survey reported they had to spend over 
ten percent of their revenue on informal costs.82 However, private 
enforcement of conflicts of interest remains weak and other forms of 
corporate corruption are also common. It has been noted that “[a]mong a 
significant number of local [Vietnamese] companies, the perception of 
bribery as a part of the Vietnamese ‘business culture’ and as ‘unavoidable’ 
has led to an acceptance of informal payments in daily business 
transactions.”83 
A recent government decision requires board members and managers 
of publicly traded companies to disclose conflicts of interest and requires 
recusal, as well as imposes duties on controlling shareholders.84 
Nevertheless, compliance remains relatively low. For example, sixty-eight 
percent of firms from the previous survey “have general written policies 
and procedures to identify, monitor and manage conflicts of interest.”85 
“However, only 45% [of survey respondents] have written rules or 
procedures, whereby their officers and management personnel must 
declare any conflicts of interest in transaction[s] with third parties.”86 
Furthermore, “the number of firms having written rules or procedures on 
staff to declare any outside [conflicts of] interests is even lower (23%).”87 
A survey of forty-five of Vietnam’s largest companies regarding 
corporate corruption revealed that more than half of the companies 
surveyed (24/45) do not make any public disclosure of their anti-
                                                     
 80. See, e.g., Thuy Thu Nguyen & Mathijs A. van Dijk, Corruption, Growth, and Governance: 
Private vs. State-Owned Firms in Vietnam, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 2935, 2936 (2012); Vietnam, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/country/VNM [https://perma.cc/DFS3-286R] 
(ranking Vietnam’s corruption perception index as 117/180).  
 81. Vietnam’s Business Environment Continues to Improve, PCI Report Shows, NHÂN DÂN 
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://en.nhandan.org.vn/business/economy/item/7397202-vietnam%E2%80%99s-
business-environment-continues-to-improve-pci-report-shows.html [https://perma.cc/33YE-GT7M]. 
 82. Id. 
 83. LIEN NGUYEN, CHRISTIAN LEVON & LINH NGUYEN, TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY, BUSINESS 
INTEGRITY IN HIGH TECH PARKS IN VIETNAM: A SURVEY REPORT 3 (2018). 
 84. See NGHỊ ĐỊNH HƯỚNG DẪN VỀ QUẢN TRỊ DOANH NGHIỆP CỦA CÔNG TY ĐẠI CHÚNG [DECREE 
GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES] [No. 71/2017/ND/CP] art. 25, 26, 
35 (Viet.) (QĐ71 makes violations of the disclosure of conflicts and related party transactions civil 
infractions); New Regulations to Prevent Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Governance, VIETNAM L. 
& LEGAL F. MAG. (June 16, 2017), http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/new-regulations-to-prevent-
conflicts-of-interest-in-corporate-governance-5896.html [https://perma.cc/2K29-BV5E]. 
 85. NGUYEN, LEVON & NGUYEN, supra note 83, at 10. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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corruption programs, and almost no companies (3/45) disclose any 
information to shareholders regarding policies prohibiting facilitation 
payments.88 
Absent evidence of shareholders actually availing themselves of the 
governance tools provided by the Enterprise Law, one can only conclude 
that the self-enforcing nature of the current corporate law has not led to 
the development of fiduciary norms during the twenty years since the 
Enterprise Law was first adopted. 
C. Preference for Public Enforcement 
In 2018, Vietnamese prosecutors charged executives of Mobifone, a 
large mobile telephone company, over a botched acquisition.89 The former 
director general of Mobifone, Cao Duy Hai, and deputy director general, 
Pham Thi Phuong Anh, were charged by the state with “violating 
regulations on managing and using public investment capital.”90 The 
government alleged the officers caused Mobifone to overpay for AVG, the 
company Mobifone was acquiring.91 In the context of U.S. corporate 
governance, “corporate waste” is at most a civil claim by shareholders 
against directors and officers and is rarely successful.92 However, such 
charges are not uncommon in Vietnamese businesses where the state 
maintains a shareholding position.93 
                                                     
 88. LIEN NGUYEN, CHRISTIAN LEVON & LINH NGUYEN, TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY, 
TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE REPORTING: ASSESSING THE 45 LARGEST COMPANIES 6–9 (2018) 
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 89. Agence France-Presse, Vietnam’s Top Telecom Bosses Face Arrest Over Loss-Making TV 
Deal Amid Corruption Crackdown, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.scmp. 
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 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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MobiFone Telecommunications Corp., PetroVietnam Biofuels JSC, Phuong Nam (Southern) Bank, 
and Saigon Beer-Alcohol-Beverage Corp. (Sabeco) among others); Kham Nguyen, Vietnam Court 
Sentences to Death PetroVietnam Ex-Chairman in Mass Trial, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-security/vietnam-court-sentences-to-death-petrovietnam-
ex-chairman-in-mass-trial-idUSKCN1C40KW [https://perma.cc/5GVP-LKE6]; Viet Tuan, Vietnam 
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[https://perma.cc/K6WJ-8P9J] (noting a case in which mismanagement of public land and state assets 
caused losses at Hai Thanh Company); Vietnam Fraud Trial: Death Penalty for Ex-Head of 
OceanBank, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41439866 [https:// 
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The Mobifone prosecution is an example of an expression of a policy 
preference in favor of public enforcement over a self-enforcing model of 
corporate governance. In this public enforcement model, the state uses 
wars and corruption as the hooks to justify state policing of violations of 
the duties of care and loyalty. Where the targets of the public enforcement 
are corporations with state investment, criminal sanctions for 
mismanagement by corporate officers at least might be rationalized. 
However, effective January 1, 2018, amendments to the Penal Code as 
well as the Anti-Corruption Law now include private business corruption 
as criminal offenses.94 The revised Anti-Corruption Law now criminalizes 
conflicts of interest in private businesses, including banning managers 
from signing contracts with businesses run by their relatives 
(notwithstanding the existence of interested director and manager safe 
harbor provisions in the Enterprise Law), among other restrictions on 
conflict transactions and relationships.95 
In addition to deployment of the Anti-Corruption Law to monitor 
conflicts of interest in the business sector, in 2017 the Government Office 
adopted new regulations related to corporate governance in publicly traded 
companies.96 In addition to laying out additional governance requirements 
for publicly traded companies, such as separation of CEO from the 
Chairman position, reiterating the right of shareholders to have access to 
books and records of the corporation, and a prohibition against tunneling, 
among other things, the decree reinforced the public enforcement aspect 
of corporate governance.97 Violations of new public company governance 
are subject to inspection by the State Securities Commission and 
administrative fines in the event of discovery of violations.98 
Perhaps in response to the difficulty in relying on corporate 
governance devices to instill a fiduciary culture, Vietnam has recently 
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 96. See NGHỊ ĐỊNH HƯỚNG DẪN VỀ QUẢN TRỊ DOANH NGHIỆP CỦA CÔNG TY ĐẠI CHÚNG [DECREE 
GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES] [No. 71/2017/ND/CP] (Viet.). 
 97. See generally id. 
 98. See id. art. 34. 
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taken this new, more aggressive tact. This shift to public enforcement 
suggests that going forward one might not expect self-enforcing 
mechanisms of the Enterprise Law to be the source of fiduciary norms. 
Rather, the source of fiduciary norms, should they develop, may well be 
found in public enforcement of anti-corruption statutes. Such a result 
would be consistent with the view that the efficacy of rule of law projects 
in Vietnam’s Đổi Mới, such as the investments made in rewriting the 
corporate law, are mixed at best.99 It also reveals a policy preference for 
public enforcement rather than self-enforcement, consistent with political 
ambivalence that can surround the embrace the of market system in 
countries that, like Vietnam, do not concurrently adopt political reforms. 
IV. THE ROLE OF INFORMAL TRANSMISSION VECTORS 
As is clear from Part III, the mere fact that the formal legal structure 
of the corporate law is self-enforcing on paper is not sufficient for it to be 
self-enforcing in real life. Moving from formal legal structures on paper 
to formal legal structures in reality requires the development of a legal 
culture that seeks to enforce these rights.100 Relying on external vectors to 
promote the transmission of fiduciary culture may provide an alternative 
to relying on domestic self or public enforcement. External vectors for the 
transmission of fiduciary culture might include foreign direct investment, 
trade agreements, and external dispute resolution mechanisms (including 
private arbitration).101 
A. Trading Relationships 
Since the end of World War II, the rapid development of an 
international trading order with the WTO at its center also gave impetus 
to renewed attention to the issues of the legal and regulatory infrastructure 
necessary for global trading to expand.102 Global trade is, of course, not a 
new discovery. However, prior to its most recent incarnation, trade was 
constrained in part by a lack of formal regulatory mechanisms to permit 
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scale, relying mostly on reputation and other informal commitment 
mechanisms.103 The new global trading order began a process of 
harmonizing the regulatory structures that govern trade and investment 
across the globe. Businesses seeking to be a part of the modern global 
trading system must comport with the system’s regulatory structure and, 
to their benefit, may also avail themselves of that same structure. The new, 
more liberalized trading regime has successfully led to a rapid growth in 
volume of trade and interconnectedness of the global supply chain by 
engendering more fluid trade relations.104 
Unlike the U.S., Vietnam is a small, open economy. It relies on its 
external relationships to provide its economy with much of the impetus it 
requires for growth. Consequently, external relationships, including the 
foreign invested sector and international trading relationships, may be 
critically important in transmitting important messages about legal culture 
that firms may, over time, adopt. 
Dispute resolution systems play a central role in international trading 
relationships. The Transpacific Partnership (TPP) for its part includes a 
controversial Investor-State Dispute Resolution clause that permits 
international investors to sue states for infringements under the trading 
arrangement.105 In addition, bilateral agreements often include provisions 
for alternate dispute resolution systems, including either domestic or 
international commercial arbitration. Outsourcing dispute resolution 
outside the home state (Vietnam) signals a lack of confidence in local 
institutions that is often justifiable. However, the scope of such 
arrangements remains focused on interfirm relationships or firm–
government relationships and does not typically extend further into the 
internal affairs of domestic firms. Commercial arbitration is generally not 
available for the resolution of internal corporate disputes.106 For the most 
part, commercial arbitration is restricted to contractual disputes between 
business entities. Consequently, any effect international vectors may have 
on the development of internal governance norms and fiduciary culture 
through the development of local courts and other self-enforcement 
mechanisms is, at best, a bankshot. 
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B. Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment is another possible vector that an open 
economy such as Vietnam may use to transfer fiduciary culture. To the 
extent that foreign invested firms act as examples of fiduciary culture, 
foreign direct investment may result in the long-term development of 
fiduciary norms. For example, although corruption is common, foreign 
invested firms in Vietnam generally do a better job of creating and 
disclosing internal processes to combat corruption and conflict of interest. 
In a recent study, more than half of Vietnam’s forty-five largest companies 
disclosed that they utilized no internal processes to combat corruption or 
conflict of interest.107 On the other hand, foreign invested companies 
outperform Vietnamese private companies in transparency related to 
combatting business corruption.108 Vietnamese private companies 
outperform state-owned enterprises on the same score.109 Though they 
score less than a hundred percent, large multinational subsidiaries score 
higher than all other types of businesses with regard to disclosure of their 
anti-corruption programs.110 
As Professor Gillespie observes, foreign investors have been among 
the strongest advocates for strengthened rule of law in Vietnam.111 Given 
their advocacy for a strengthened rule of law and attention to internal 
anti-corruption programs, one might expect foreign investors to provide 
momentum for the development of fiduciary culture. However, there is 
reason to suspect that these claims are limited, particularly those that 
suggest external mechanisms, like trade agreements or foreign investment, 
will have direct effects on internal governance of Vietnamese 
corporations.112 
Foreign investment in the earliest years was largely dominated by 
foreign–domestic joint venture structures.113 The joint venture structure 
provides a potentially excellent vehicle for transmission of cultural norms 
necessary for the development of fiduciary culture.114 However, the 
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impetus for the development of the joint ownership structure was land 
access, not business expertise. Foreign investors in need of land to build 
factories or other facilities had to join with local ventures to access this 
land. Vietnamese partners in such joint ventures were almost exclusively 
state-owned enterprises and often had little subject matter expertise to 
bring to the table.115 As a result, the joint venture structure was largely a 
product of regulatory arbitrage rather than a desire to transfer knowledge 
or corporate culture. Following the implementation of the U.S.–Vietnam 
Trade Agreement in 2001 and other market opening moves, joint ventures 
mostly gave way to wholly-owned foreign enterprises as foreign-invested 
firms were granted greater access to land without engaging with local 
enterprises.116 While wholly foreign-owned firms may still be vehicles for 
transferring fiduciary culture, the process for doing so would be a longer 
process than under joint-venture structures. 
In recent years, especially since the development of Vietnam’s 
capital market and the implementation of the TPP, foreign investors have 
begun to more easily access the Vietnamese market via financial 
investments rather than using more traditional direct investment paths.117 
Implementation of the TPP permits foreign investors to control as much 
as fifty percent of a domestic entity without needing to seek special 
approval or license as a foreign investment.118 Financial investments in 
publicly-traded Vietnamese companies provide an opportunity to jump 
start the development of fiduciary culture, especially where foreign 
financial investments are accompanied by board representation. 
In some cases, however, entry via financial investments has not been 
smooth. ThaiBev, a Thai beer producer, is an example of this challenge. 
In December 2017, ThaiBev purchased 53.58% of SABECO, a 
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state-owned beer producer, as part of Vietnam’s privatization program.119 
Consistent with the Enterprise Law, ThaiBev then sought to take control 
of the seven person board.120 However, the incumbent directors refused to 
seat ThaiBev’s representatives.121 Rather than take advantage of their 
rights under the Enterprise Law to seek an order from a court enforcing 
their rights as controlling shareholders of SABECO, ThaiBev sought the 
intervention of the Office of the Prime Minister to order its directors be 
seated.122 ThaiBev took effective control of the company in April 2018, 
after the government (but importantly, not a court) ordered its directors be 
seated.123 
Although financial investments offer a vector to transmit fiduciary 
culture, fiduciary culture remains very much a work in progress. 
Nevertheless, Essa et al. report evidence that the presence of foreign 
investors or significant state ownership discourages opportunistic 
behavior by controlling shareholders.124 For example, when minority 
investors arrive at the table with base expectations of fiduciary culture, the 
presence of foreign investors can deter their opportunism and serve as a 
vector for transmission of fiduciary culture over time. The presence of 
state ownership, on the other hand, likely reflects the fact that the state 
continues to carry a big stick and that the threat of public enforcement 
through criminal prosecution is not without effect.125 
1. Blockholding 
Perhaps one obstacle to the development of fiduciary culture within 
business organizations is that Vietnam’s largest corporations are 
                                                     
 119. ThaiBev Files Complaint Over Saigon Beer Board, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/ThaiBev-files-complaint-against-Saigon-Beer-following 
-48-acquisition [https://perma.cc/ECM8-U87K]; see also Khanh Vu, SABECO Adds Representatives 
of Major Shareholder ThaiBev to Board, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018) https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-sabeco-thai-beverage-board/sabeco-adds-representatives-of-major-shareholder-thai 
bev-to-board-idUSKBN1HU11W [https://perma.cc/F9MX-JRA3]; ThaiBev Joins SABECO Board 
After Govt Steps In, VIET. NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/426838/thaibev-
joins-sabeco-board-after-govt-stepsin.html#hz5CYb0ckiOvbU41.97 [https://perma.cc/CLC3-ZA8S]. 
 120. ThaiBev Files Complaint Over Saigon Beer Board, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/ThaiBev-files-complaint-against-Saigon-Beer-following 
-48-acquisition [https://perma.cc/ECM8-U87K].  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See generally SAMY ESSA, REZUAL KABIR & HUY TUAN NGUYEN, UNIV. OF TWENTE 
(NETHERLANDS), DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT EARNINGS MANAGEMENT? EVIDENCE 
FROM VIETNAM (2016).  
 125. Prosecutions for misuse of state assets remain common in Vietnam. See, e.g., Mai Nguyen, 
Vietnam Arrests Two Ex-Ministers Suspected of Mismanaging Public Investment, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-security/vietnam-arrests-two-ex-ministers-
suspected-of-mismanaging-public-investment-idUSKCN1QC082 [https://perma.cc/D9CY-7V7Q]. 
604 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:579 
dominated by blockholding structures rather than by Berle–Means 
corporations. The statutory framework for corporate governance in 
Vietnam takes its root from the lessons of Berle and Means and relies 
heavily on self-enforcement by shareholders. However, to the extent that 
Vietnamese corporations are more susceptible to controller agency 
problems than they are to manager agency problems, the corporate 
governance tools available to stockholders may not be up to the task of 
constraining controller opportunism. 
Vietnam is still dominated by private companies, most of which are 
family-owned businesses. In such companies, the focus of fiduciary 
culture allows shareholders to use the tools of corporate law to mitigate 
management agency costs. This focus seems inappropriate because in 
family-owned firms, the separation of ownership and control are 
attenuated.126 Indeed, Gillespie observes that corporate law in all its 
aspects is at least a second order issue in family-controlled private 
companies in Vietnam.127 
If law is going to matter, then it will matter to Vietnamese public 
companies, where manager agency costs will ostensibly be more 
important. However, as it turns out, public companies in Vietnam are not 
traditional Berle–Means corporations. Rather than seeing a separation of 
ownership and control, insiders control large blocks of stock. Le and Le 
found that the average blockholding size in their sample of publicly-traded 
Vietnamese firms was forty percent in 2013.128 The State is the largest 
blockholder in Vietnamese public companies, holding control blocks in 
seventy-one percent of the companies with blockholders in 2013.129 
During the period of 2009–2013, the average blockholding size remained 
relatively constant.130 However, the composition of the blockholding has 
been slightly shifting with private domestic shareholders increasing their 
positions at the expense of state control as the government privatized its 
positions in firms.131 Managers and foreign investors do not appear to be 
benefitting from this shifting of control. The government’s policy of 
privatizing state stock positions in publicly-traded positions is not creating 
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Berle–Means corporations but rather transferring control from the state to 
private controllers.132 
Identity of Blockholders (percentage) 133 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Manager  6% 4% 4% 4% 3% 
State 78% 75% 73% 72% 71% 
Local Private 14% 18% 19% 20% 22% 
Foreign 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Corporate structures in Vietnam are characterized by a high degree 
of concentrated control, similarly to those in many other developing 
countries and the United States during the period before the Berle and 
Means study.134 Whereas the typical Berle–Means corporation may be 
subject to managerial agency costs, Shleifer and Vishny observed that 
highly concentrated ownership is also subject to controller agency costs.135 
Controllers have incentives and the means to siphon private benefits of 
control at the expense of minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny also 
argue that the economic entrenchment of elites can bias capital allocation, 
slow capital market development, and obstruct outsiders from entering 
markets.136 VinGroup, the largest private corporate business group in 
Vietnam, is an excellent example of a controlled Vietnamese 
corporation.137 VinGroup is controlled by Mr. Pham Nhat Vuong, 
Vietnam’s first billionaire.138 The VinGroup corporate business 
organization has adopted a familiar pyramid structure with control over a 
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series of subsidiaries held at the holding company level.139 Pyramid 
structures, like the one used by VinGroup, are common in developing 
countries.140 Such structures make extracting private benefits of control 
easier for controlling shareholders by permitting controllers to maintain 
control over the group, while also reducing the equity committed to the 
controlled group.141 
Figure 2 VinGroup Corporate Structure: Evidence of Pyramiding142 
Blockholding affords different challenges than those that appear 
where manager agency costs are the focus. For example, the presence of 
controlling shareholders and pyramid structures suggests that tunneling or 
expropriation of private benefits by controlling shareholders may be a 
governance problem in Vietnamese companies.143 In fact, Toan and Tran 
provide evidence that suggests that controllers engage in tunneling and 
expropriating private benefits by way of excess receivables in controlled 
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entities.144 The pernicious effect of pyramid structures that accompany 
blockholding is well-known and is no doubt one reason why the 
Vietnamese government adopted 71/2017 ND-CP, which placed such 
transactions under greater scrutiny.145 Absent workable tools for minority 
shareholders to constrain opportunism by controllers, blockholding works 
against the development of fiduciary culture. However, Toan and Tran 
find that tunneling activity is constrained when firms increase their 
reliance on bank financing.146 As firms with blockholders increase their 
reliance on outside bank financing, they reduce their tunneling activity.147 
This suggests a role for banks, as third parties looking over the shoulders 
of blockholders, to help improve fiduciary culture.148 Of course, reliance 
on bank financing is no guarantee against poor corporate governance, 
especially when bankers themselves are also open to corruption.149 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of the law and development movement and its 
successor, the new rule of law movement, is that it began with a belief, 
sometimes justified, that merely changing the formal legal and regulatory 
structures would affect development of legal culture. Legal culture, 
however, is embedded in a larger social context.150 Merely changing legal 
rules will not necessarily result in changes to legal norms and legal culture. 
The example of corporate governance in Vietnam is a case in point. 
One might agree that proper corporate governance exists to minimize the 
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership of capital from 
control that is exemplified by the management of most modern businesses. 
Efficient corporate governance structures are those, like the self-
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enforcement regimes described earlier in this Article, that minimize 
incentives for managers to engage in self-dealing behavior while placing 
incentives on outside shareholders to engage in oversight. However, 
creation of self-enforcement mechanisms will not necessarily result in the 
development of fiduciary culture, especially when the problems faced by 
firms can be attributable in part to controller agency costs. 
After Vietnam’s now more than thirty years of experience 
developing its corporate governance, the results have been decidedly 
mixed. On the one hand, by removing obstacles to incorporation through 
shifting to a registration system, Vietnam has enjoyed an explosion in the 
growth of private enterprise since 2000. On the other hand, this rapid 
growth in the establishment of private businesses has not translated into 
the development of fiduciary culture. Rather than seeing a self-enforcing 
fiduciary culture, Vietnam has circled back to public enforcement of 
fiduciary principles. Under the guise of anti-corruption and anti-waste 
efforts, authorities are policing violations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, 
violations that under self-enforcing structures like the current Enterprise 
Law should be policed by shareholders. This approach signals a policy 
preference to develop fiduciary culture enforced through public, rather 
than private, mechanisms—this notwithstanding the content of self-
enforcing corporate law that the country adopted in recent years. Despite 
this policy preference, fiduciary culture may still develop endogenously 
through the influence of foreign financial investors with board 
representation as well as through the oversight of banks providing 
financing to the businesses. 
It should be clear, given the past three decades experience of 
economic reform and transition in Vietnam, that the development of 
fiduciary culture and corporate governance is generally an organic process 
that responds to conditions specific to the cultural background against 
which they play out over time rather than to changes in the statute. This 
distinction is a lesson from the law and development movement that is 
learned once and again. As markets and corporate ownership structures 
develop and mature, there may well be internal pressures to take advantage 
of the tools offered by the corporate law and to develop robust governance 
structures. Perhaps those structures will resemble the self-enforcing 
fiduciary culture readily identifiable by American legal scholars, or 
perhaps not. 
